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Resumo 
Constitucionalismo cooperativo é a palavra de ordem 
no século XXI, e a criação de uma rede judiciária é uma 
ferramenta importante para o desenvolvimento de um 
sistema de proteção aos direitos humanos. Este artigo 
contribui neste campo, relatando a moldura constitucio-
nal e as principais decisões havidas nas Cortes Constitu-
cionais brasileira e colombiana, na proteção ao direito 
fundamental à moradia. A comparação é justificada pela 
proximidade histórica na transição jurídica em ambos os 
países – a do Brasil, em 1988, e a da Colombia em 1991 –; 
e também pela clara inspiração que a Colombia houve da 
constituição brasileira. Como a narrativa vai demonstrar, 
cláusulas constitucionais formais não foram o elemento-
chave para assegurar eficácia ao direito fundamental à 
moradia; os resultados na Colombiana apresentam-se 
mais sólidos e baseados em parâmetros normativos, não 
obstante o texto da constituição não proveja direitos re-
vestidos de eficácia imediata.
Palavras-chave: direito fundamental à moradia; jurisdi-
ção constitucional no Brasil e na Colômbia; direitos so-
cioeconômicos; interpretação constitucional. 
Abstract
Cooperative constitutionalism is the watchword in the 21st. 
century, and the creation of a judicial network is an impor-
tant tool to improve human rights protection. This paper in-
tends to contribute in that field, reporting the constitutional 
framework and the main decisions held by the Brazilian and 
the Colombian Constitutional Courts in protecting housing 
rights. The comparison is justified by the historical proximity 
in the juridical transition in both countries – 1988 in Brazil 
and 1991 in Colombia –; and also by the clear inspiration 
that Colombia took in the Brazilian Constitution at the time 
of their Constituent Assembly. As the narrative may show, 
formal constitutional clauses were not the key element to 
assure some level of efficacy to the housing right; Colom-
bian results seems to be more solid and based in normative 
parameters, even though the literal text of the constitution 
does not provide housing rights with immediate efficacy.
Keywords: housing right; judicial adjudication in Brazil 
and Colombia; socioeconomic rights; constitutional inter-
pretation.
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1. COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM: BARRIERS 
IN LEARNING FROM EACH OTHER
Constitutionalism and judicial review, as featured in postmodern political prac-
tice in democratic States, is an idea that has broken frontiers and now prevails from the 
United States to the more recently institutionally reorganized republics in Africa and 
Asia. After all, according to a so called canonical view, “the crowning proof of democra-
cy in our times is the growing acceptance and enforcement of the idea that democracy 
is not the same thing as majority rule”1 – which leads to an institutional design that con-
templates counter majoritarian tools that may guarantee minorities a political voice. 
The universalization of that model – constitutionalism and judicial review – 
brought an unexpected bonus: submission of conflicts related mainly to fundamental 
rights to Constitutional Courts worldwide, providing a rich environment to compara-
tive analysis, and the possibility of a productive exchange between these same courts2. 
That environment allows comparative constitutionalism to move from constitutional 
texts to real examples in constitutional adjudication, creating what Tushnet3 called ju-
dicial network, provided the necessary dialogue between Courts and countries.
That kind of exchange is especially useful in countries in which constitution-
al provisions related with fundamental rights embrace also the socioeconomic ones, 
proposing all the difficult questions related with immediate or progressive realisation, 
funding, minimum core, etc. In facing those challenges, getting in touch with foreign 
experiences might be enlightening.
1  HIRSCHL, Ran.  Towards juristocracy. The origins and consequences of the new constitutionalism.  Cam-
bridge-Massachussets-London: Harvard University Press, 2004, p. 1.
2  Zagrebelsky, referring to that same exchange phenomena uses the expression “judiciary cosmopolitism” (ZA-
GREBELSKY, Gustavo.  Jueces constitucionales. Boletín Mexicano de Derecho Comparado, nueva serie, año 
XXXIX, nº 117, septiembre-deciembre de 2006, p. 1135-1151).
3  TUSHNET, Mark.  The Inevitable Globalization of Constitutional Law (December 18, 2008). Hague Institute 
for the Internationalization of Law; Harvard Public Law Working Paper No. 09-06. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1317766 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1317766
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The South African Constitution embraces expressly that idea, allowing their courts 
to consider foreign law in their own reasoning4. In other precedents, Constitutional Courts 
world have been evoking each other rulings, building a some what general consensus in 
conceptualizing human rights and the best strategies to protect them in an hostile envi-
ronment as such provided by extreme individualism and profound social cleavages. The 
phenomena – one of the many aspects of what Schauer has already called legal trans-
plantation5 – seems to be in an ascendant path, due to many reasons, among which one 
should include the growing importance of international courts and forums oriented to 
building a transnational view of the inherent relationship between democracy and law6.
That kind of global or transnational jurisprudence is perceived, especially by 
Constitutional Courts as a powerful tool to learn about foreign understanding related 
to human rights7; and also to increase the legitimacy and effectiveness in their own 
decisions. One notable exception in accepting foreign approaches in legal reasoning 
when it comes to human rights is the United States, the idea that any kind of inter-
change may result in a cultural contamination, therefore, in some kind of depreciation 
of the American constitutional interpretation is still somehow, present8. Even in the US, 
the perception that globalizing jurisprudence may be useful is a rising path9, as can be 
noted from Justice Breyer’s assertion at Yale Law School, last September 19, 2014, ac-
cording to which “The only way to preserve our American values, which are now widely 
shared, is to know more  — not less — about what is going on abroad,”10.
4  South Africa Constitution, Chapter 2 – Bill of Rights, Sec. 39 – Interpretation of Bill of Rights: When interpret-
ing the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum (…) (b) must consider international law; and (c) may consider 
foreign law.
5  SCHAUER, Frederick.  The politics and incentives of legal transplantation. CID Working Paper nº 44, April 
2000, Law and Development Paper nº 2, [on line], available at <http://www.hks.harvard.edu/var/ezp_site/
storage/fckeditor/file/pdfs/centers-programs/centers/cid/publications/faculty/wp/044.pdf>, access in 
02/15/2013.
6  The Venice Commission is a good example of an advisory body on constitutional matters that started as-
sembling European countries, and that now aggregates also Latin American and Asian states like Chile, Korea, 
Morocco and Brazil.
7  One notable exception in accepting foreign approaches in legal reasoning when it comes to human rights 
is the United States, where it’s still predominant the idea that any kind of interchange may result in a cultural 
contamination, therefore, in some kind of depreciation of the American constitutional interpretation. System-
atizing objections to the use of foreign decisions as even a persuasive argument, POSNER, Richard.  No thanks, 
we already have our own laws. Legal Affairs July/ August 2004. Available at http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/
July-August-2004/feature_posner_julaug04.msp, access in 01/31/2013.
8  Presenting objections to the use of foreign decisions as even a persuasive argument, POSNER, Richard.  No 
thanks, we already have our own laws. Legal Affairs July/ August 2004. Available at http://www.legalaffairs.org/
issues/July-August-2004/feature_posner_julaug04.msp, access in 01/31/2013.
9  Systematizing statistics and precedents in which the use of transnational jurisprudence, Globalizing Juris-
prudence, MCKINSTRY, Lucy. The Use of Foreign Authority in Domestic Constitutional Interpretation. Eruditio - 
Duke University’s Undergraduate Humanities Journal, Volume 28: 2007-2008, [on line], available at https://
web.duke.edu/erudito/McKinstry.html, access in 10/28/2014.
10  SHIMER, David.  Supreme Court justice underscores constitutional values. Yale Daily News. September 19, 2014. 
Available at http://yaledailynews.com/blog/2014/09/19/supreme-court-justice-underscores-constitutional- 
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Nevertheless, there are still barriers that elude the potential learning benefits 
when it comes to that desired exchange between constitutional courts. Social context, 
political ambience, judicial practice, institutional design; all these are elements that 
help understanding why in some cases, a Court’s decision supports a broader com-
prehension or a minimalistic approach when it comes to a certain fundamental right; a 
mandatory remedy or a dialogical one11. 
Another barrier – prosaic, but still relevant – is language.   Even though Spanish, is 
a language spoken by more than 330 million people, which may lead to a greater dissemi-
nation to the decisions held by, Latin American Courts, the fact is that the law community, 
even in that same continent has not achieved the ideal level of exchanging experiences 
and critical analysis. Language can also be the reason why the so-called constitutionalism 
of the Global South12 encompasses distinct experiences like India and South Africa – but 
excludes Brazil and Argentina. Still, courts’ decisions deal with repeated subjects – espe-
cially in the human rights field, where states echoes worldwide a quite similar agenda, 
strongly influenced by the concerns noted in the international community. 
This paper is part of an effort toward breaking through this isolation13, sharing a 
judiciary perception revealed in recent decisions in Brazil and Colombia, on the partic-
ular subject of housing rights. The main purpose is to allow a broader understanding of 
how that fundamental right has been normatively entrenched in the Brazilian and the 
Colombian constitution, and how the judiciary, highlighting similarities and differences 
in each experience, is reading that formal provision. A dialogue may happen, in certain 
aspects, with decisions held by the South African Court, which has, since the Govern-
ment of the Republic of South Africa and others vs. Grootboom vs. others, also developed 
very interesting parameters to judiciary scrutiny when it comes to protecting housing 
rights.
values/; access in 10/28/2014.
11  Pointing out the difficulties related  with a real understanding of the real social, political, cultural and eco-
nomic conditions that constrict constitutional law in a country in which you are not directly inserted, ZUM-
BANSEN, Peer, Comparative, Global and Transnational Constitutionalism: The Emergence of a Transnational 
Legal-Pluralist Order (2011). Comparative Research in Law & Political Economy. Research Paper No. 24/2011. 
Available at http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/clpe/62, access in 03/12/2013.
12  MALDONADO, Daniel Bonilla.  Constitutionalism of the Global South. The Activist Tribunals of India. South 
Africa and Colombia.  US: Cambridge University Press, 2013.
13  A first effort in publicizing how socioeconomic rights have been judicialized in the Brazilian experience can 
be found in VALLE, Vanice Lírio do.  Judicialization of Socio-Economic Rights in Brazil: The Subversion of 
an Egalitarian Discourse (March 30, 2012). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2031719 or http://
dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2031719. Analyzing the troublesome effect of judicialization – the regressive poten-
tial present in that kind of adjudication, VALLE, Vanice Lírio do, Judicialization of Socioeconomic Rights in 
Brazil: Mercantilization of the Fundamental Rights as a Deviance in Rights Protection. Paper presented 
in the 3rd YCC Conference - American Society of Comparative law, (April, 2014). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.
com/abstract=2511648.
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The comparative analysis between the Colombian Constitutional Court, and the 
Brazilian judicial decisions in the matter, evidences a very significative empirical finding: 
the effectiveness of a socioeconomic right do not rely in its normative assertion. After 
all, it is always very difficult bring to reality provisions that formulate allocative choices 
about public expenditure through socioeconomic rights. That practical evidence reaf-
firm that constitutional choices are not out of the politics realm of deliberation; and 
underlines the need of new tools, when it comes to adjudication in judicial review; tools 
that may face a structural problem related with the ineffectiveness of a socioeconomic 
rights, using the same approach.
This paper is presented in 6 parts: in Part I the possible contribution from the 
Brazilian and Colombian experiences to a supranational judicial network in the housing 
rights subject is discussed. Part II is dedicated to a narrative of the political processes 
that lead to the Brazilian and the Colombian constitution in the late 80’s and early 90’s. 
Understanding the political ambience is a key factor to comprehending the constitu-
tional features on both countries, and the subsequent development of its interpreta-
tion in socioeconomic rights. Part III presents the constitutional provision in the Co-
lombian and the Brazilian constitutions in regard to housing rights; it will also describe 
the general aspects of how the constitutional matter related with a violation of such 
right may be brought to judicial appreciation. In Part IV some relevant decisions will be 
brought to attention, in order to allow a glance of how those Constitutional Courts are 
dealing with these conflicts. Part V finally presents an important feature not explored 
by either of the courts: the participatory dimension, and its importance in enforcing a 
democratic practice.
2. REDEMOCRATIZATION IN LATIN AMERICA AT THE END OF THE 
XX CENTURY: THE BRAZILIAN AND THE COLOMBIAN CASES
 The last three decades held a sensible number of transitional political changes 
in Latin America, most of them resulting in new constitutions14, or in profound amend-
ment processes in the previous texts15. These experiences held in countries that carry 
common traces of historicity and geography, have been studied as different manifes-
tations of what has been named Latin American constitutionalism16. The Brazilian and 
14  Brazil was the first one to adopt a new constitution in 1988, followed by Colombia (1991), Paraguay (1992), 
Peru (1993), Venezuela (1999), Ecuador (2008) and Bolivia (2009). 
15  Costa Rica was the first one to step into that path in 1989, followed by Mexico (1992) and Argentina (1994).
16  Analyzing features of the Latin America constitutionalism, UPRIMNY, Rodrigo.  The recent transforma-
tion of Constitutional Law in Latin America: trends and challenges. Texas Law Review, Vol. 89, 2011, p. 
1587/1609. Available at: http://www.texaslrev.com/wp-content/uploads/Uprimny-89-TLR-1587.pdf, access 
in 01/31/2013. For a broader analysis, grounded in historical aspects of the constitutionalization process in 
Latin America, GARGARELLA, Roberto. Latin American Constitutionalism, 1810-2010. US: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2013.
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the Colombian experiences are very close given to time proximity, therefore, to the 
express inspiration that the latter one took in ideas from the former. Surely, both texts 
have already been amended – but these changes have not subverted the original foun-
dational idea translated in both constitutions. 
2.1.  Constituent Assembly in Brazil and Colombia 
– a brief historical overview
The two countries engaged themselves in a political transformation through 
negotiation and agreement, in spite of violence or revolution, even though they had 
experienced serious arbitrariness and violence in their recent past. That search for set-
tlement brought very peculiar features to the political process through which both the 
constitution were written – and should be took into account in order to comprehend 
the result of the constituent assembly in each of the two countries.
In Brazil, after almost three decades of military dictatorship, and the defeat in 
1984 of the massive popular movement in favour of direct elections to presidency17, 
the country found itself with a former leader of the conservative party as President – 
and the approval of a new constitution appears to be a proper strategy to consolidate 
the redemocatization process. Without the charismatic leadership of Tancredo Neves, 
and dealing with the contingency of a non-wanted President; a man who has had re-
lations with the military regime; the delicate balance among forces needed something 
new in the public agenda that might lay as foundation to a deeper change. 
The Constitutional Assembly was called through a constitutional amendment 
sent to the national Congress by President Sarney in July 1985, in the very early days 
of his term. The amendment granted constitutional powers to the National Congress, 
which was to be elect in 1986, a mild solution that brought a lot of criticism because 
it would lead to an accumulation of the ordinary legislative functions, with the more 
prominent task of carving the new Fundamental Law. 
Despite the initial difficulties, the Constituent Assembly took place, and deliber-
ation happened in an ambience of delicate balance between conservative forces, and 
progressive ones. Brazilian political literature points that the inclusion of a broad list 
of fundamental rights – related with liberty, but also socioeconomic ones – was the 
17  The popular campaign asking for direct elections for presidency in 1984 was defeated – the constitutional 
amendment needed to do so was not approved, and so the Electoral College prevail as the way to nomi-
nate the President. Nevertheless, millions of citizens in the street asking for direct elections for the presidency 
showed conservatives that they would not be able to elect whoever they want; the solution was to compro-
mise with Tancredo Neves candidacy – a man identified with the redemocratizing movement, but also a very 
experienced politician, who was believed to have the ability to complete the political transition with the mil-
itary. Unfortunately, Tancredo Neves got ill in his inauguration`s eve, and the Vice-President took office – at 
first, as a provisory decision; becoming definitive with the death of the elected President in April 21st, 1985. 
José Sarney, a former leader in the conservative party, indicated as Vice-President in the slate as a strategy of 
facilitating a winning in the Electoral College was, out of pure dumb lock, President in Brazil. 
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strategic path adopted by the progressive forces that were present at the Constituent 
Assembly, in order to create at least, priorities in the political agenda settled by social 
inclusiveness. That plan of action was complete with an institutional design that con-
templates a variety of agents that might control the adherence, by the political process, 
to those constitutional values and priorities.
In 1988, the Constitution was promulgated, and given the name “the Citizen 
Constitution”, since it prioritised the country’s citizens and the national goal of social 
inclusion. Even though the 83 amendments that were already approved in the Brazilian 
constitution, the central distribution of power, and the main commitment with social 
transformation is still there – actually, it is reinforced by new clauses related with public 
funding for all those socioeconomic rights. 
Colombia also had its Constitutional Assembly summoned through an uncon-
ventional path. At the end of the 80’s, President Virgilio Barco intended to summon a 
referendum to consolidate peace agreements with rebel political movements in Colom-
bia – especially M-19, but the drug trafficking movement reacted so violently that the 
idea was postponed indefinitely. 
The trigger to overcome that deadlock was a student movement called “The 
seventh ballot”. It all began with a popular campaign, proposing that the nation’s citi-
zens, who were to vote for seats in the Senate, House of Representatives, Departmental 
Assembly, and other political positions, brought with them to the voting booth a sev-
enth ballot (a simple paper with a pre-agreed message) in which they’d express their 
desire to have a Constitutional Assembly summoned. Answering to that informal call to 
express their desire for a new Constitution, 2 million citizens, comprising a total of 88% 
of the votes, brought the seventh ballot to voting booths – which showed the inevita-
bility in summoning the Constitutional Assembly. 
A legislative decree18 was then edited – Decreto Legislativo 927 de 1990 (3 de 
mayo) – allowing the electoral branch to consider ballots in which the people would 
be inquired about their agreement with the summoning of a Constituent Assembly, 
designated to promote a large constitutional reform. Those ballots should be offered 
and counted in the presidential election that would be held in the same year – and 
might give more formality to the undoubted popular will showed through the “Seventh 
Ballot” movement. One should take into account that the country had been under siege 
for the past 6 years, and that certainly, a Constituent Assembly could not be summoned 
by a simple act of the Executive branch “allowing” votes to be counted.  It was a bold 
choice, quickly submitted to judicial scrutiny by the Supreme Court, arguing about that 
formal flaw.
18  The expression “legislative decree” could be deceiving; this is a normative act – for sure – but edited by the 
Executive Branch.
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In spite of all the legal concerns, the Supreme Court of Justice held the decree 
constitutional19, pronouncing that the deliberation it held was among in the inherent 
powers grant to the President by the siege. The Court also proclaimed an “evident” con-
nexion between the summoning of the Constituent Assembly; the definitions of a new 
institutional framework to political power and the overcoming of the violence and the 
lack of institutional order that determined the siege itself. As a result, convene the Con-
stituent Assembly was affirmed to be possible, and the next step was to model the 
proceedings that may be applied. 
The design of the procedure to be observed through constituent deliberation 
was turned public by Decreto Legislativo 1926 de 1990, drawing limits to the Assem-
bly’s deliberation – all of them related to a political agreement celebrated between the 
competing forces that lead Colombia to the path of violence and instability resulting in 
the siege20. The Supreme Court of Justice in examining that new decree sustained the 
same approach about the importance of a free and unlimited Constituent Assembly, 
that should give voice to a (re)foundational pact among Colombians21. That premise 
leads to a decision holding unconstitutional the provisions in that decree which repre-
sented limitations to the free deliberation of the peoples representatives in the Constit-
uent Assembly. In the use by the Court of a quotation from Bobbio22, one could identify 
the leading thought in those decisions: the political life is develop through conflicts 
never completely solved, in which a solution is achieved through agreements, truce 
and those more lasting peace treaties called constitutions.
The Constituent Assembly took place in Colombia in a very pluralistic political 
ambience, reincorporating social tendencies that were excluded of the political life23. 
19  COLOMBIA. SUPERIOR COUT OF JUSTICE. Sentencia 59, mayo veinticuatro (24) de mil novecientos noventa 
(1990). Sala Plena, Expediente No. 2149 (334-E). Available at ftp://ftp.camara.gov.co/camara/basedoc/csj_nf/
sp/1990/csj_sp_s59_2505_1990.html.
20  The political process to build some kind of agreement that may facilitate the approval of a new consti-
tutional order is similar to the one held in South Africa. A broad conversation involving political parties, so-
cial movements and even paramilitary organizations in Colombia ended with the stipulation of subjects that 
should be reformed or brought to the constitutional reform – just like the 34 points that guided the South 
Africa constitutional process. In Colombia, due to a fear that the delicate balance might be lost, the proposal 
in Decreto Legislativo numero 1926 de 1990 was that only those specific subjects were to be considered in the 
deliberation process – and that was the clause ruled unconstitutional by the Court, given to the unacceptable 
result of the originary constituent power.
21  COLOMBIA. SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE. Sentencia 138, octubre nueve (9) de mil novecientos noventa 
(1990). Sala Plena, Expediente No. 2214 (351-E). Available at ftp://ftp.camara.gov.co/camara/basedoc/csj_nf/
sp/1990/csj_sp_s138_0910_1990.html, access in 02/05/2013.
22  COLOMBIA. SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE. Sentencia 59, mayo veinticuatro (24) de mil novecientos noventa 
(1990). Sala Plena, Expediente No. 2149 (334-E). Available at ftp://ftp.camara.gov.co/camara/basedoc/csj_nf/
sp/1990/csj_sp_s59_2505_1990.html, Consideraciones de la Corte, c) La conexidad.
23  UPRIMNY YEPES, Rodrigo.  Should Courts enforce social rights? The Experience of 
the Colombian Constitutional Court. [on line], available at <http://www.google.com.br/
url?sa=t&rct=j&q=housing%20rights%20colombia%20constitutional%20court&source=web&c-
d = 9 & v e d = 0 C F 8 Q F j A I & u r l = h t t p % 3 A % 2 F % 2 F w w w . d e j u s t i c i a . o r g % 2 F a d m i n % 2 F f i l e .
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As a result, the deliberative process was – just like in Brazil – very balanced, each subject 
held at a time, in a delicate operation destined to build consensus.
This was not the last event in the Colombian constitutional life – the political in-
stability, and the recurrent issue of reintegrating in political life who had been involved 
with violent tactics in the past still impels new proposals in constitutional amendment. 
Such initiatives, like the previous constitution amendment that took place in 2003, and 
the current proposition in expanding jurisdiction to military courts, in order to examine 
incidents of violence and crime that occurred during the harsher siege period; although 
very important to build an accurate understanding about the Colombian constitutional 
ambience, won’t harm the analysis in the judicial appreciation of conflicts related with 
socioeconomic rights, and specially, the housing rights.
Given to their root in a strong popular mobilization as a trigger to constitutional 
change, it is not surprising that in both countries, the new fundamental chart came to light 
with a strong commitment to promoting democracy in it’s two dimensions (representative 
and participative)24 and to fundamental rights, social justice and promoting equality. The 
problem is that those new systems require a completely different way in building public 
choices. Public Administration has now constitutional guidelines about which should be 
the result of its own plan of action, and defiance of those same purposes qualifies as a con-
stitutional violation, and can be object of judicial scrutiny, through a huge variety of law-
suits. A new balance of powers is to be establish, in a normative system in which constitu-
tional law requires public action from the Executive and Legislative branch – and allows the 
Judiciary to rule about sufficiency, adequacy and efficiency of those same public policies.
2.2.  Fundamental rights in the constitutional 
system in Brazil and Colombia
Even though theoretical categories like transitional, aspirational or transforma-
tion constitutionalism25 were not organized in the early 90’s – and cannot be pointed 
php%3Ftable%3Ddocumentos_publicacion%26field%3Darchivo%26id%3D67&ei=wRoeUZSfLoaY-
9QTu8ID4Ag&usg=AFQjCNHIpwsZ6gvQRl-38EUzpX_HvGLXIg&bvm=bv.42553238,d.eWU>, access in 
02/15/2013: “As a result, more than forty per cent of the delegates did not belong to the Liberal and Conser-
vative parties, which until that day had dominated the political scene, and many interpreted the situation as 
the end of the two-party system of political domination. Moreover, given that the voting system was based 
on qualified majorities, and there was no clearly dominant group, all the assembly’s delegates had to seek 
consensus and organize dialogue and transactions to make decisions”.
24  In Colombia, participation as an essential feature of democracy was a pivotal subject; after all, the para-
military organizations intended to be reinserted in the political life. In Brazil, on the contrary, consolidating 
a representative democracy was the first concern – after all, the constitution succeeded three decades of au-
thoritarian military government, in which even when elections took place, the representation principle was 
undermined by elections rules, and the occupancy of political positions like Senator or mayor in the states 
capitals happened through direct nomination – and not democratic suffrage.
25  Systematizing features of transitional constitutionalism, YEH JIUNN-RONG e CHANG WEN-CHEN. The Chang-
ing Landscape of Modern Constitutionalism: Transitional Perspective (march 31, 2009). National Taiwan 
University Law review, Vol. 4, No 1, pp.158, 2009. Available in: <http:ssrn.com/abstract=1482863>, access 
Revista de Investigações Constitucionais, Curitiba, vol. 1, n. 2, p. 67-102, maio/ago. 2014.76 
Vanice Regina Lírio do Valle
as a model or inspiration for the Brazilian or Colombian constitutions –, the intention of 
promoting change and overcoming social exclusion presents itself as a clear objective 
in both political experiences26. In fact, committing to fundamental rights was a strate-
gy carried by progressive forces in both Constituent Assemblies to establish a political 
agenda oriented to social inclusiveness, in subjects where, at that time, there was not 
enough political consensus to allow a definite constitutional provision27. 
Both constitutions came to light with an extensive list of fundamental rights, 
including those referred to as socioeconomic ones. In a comparative perspective, that 
strategy aligns with a worldwide tendency in constitutional design present since the 
late 1990’s, of formally recognizing socioeconomic rights. The analytic structure ad-
opted particularly by the Brazilian Constitution – there are 78 individual fundamental 
rights listed in article 5; and 34 in article 6, which contemplates socioeconomic rights28 
– is a testimony of the belief that social transformation may be achieved through con-
stitutional commitments.
Nevertheless, they differ in a very important aspect: efficacy. In the Brazilian 
constitution, art. 5º § 1º asserts that every fundamental right is endowed with immedi-
ate efficacy29. That express command was jurisprudentially extended to each and every 
fundamental right – including the socioeconomic ones. The most important conse-
quence of that assumption is that any violation of fundamental rights expressed in the 
in 05/10/2012 and KHATIWADA, A. 2008. Constitutionalism of transition. Kathmandu Law Review, 1(1):1-
17. Available in: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1500826. Access in: 04/07/2012. On the subject of transformative 
constitutionalism, CHRISTIANSEN, E.C. 2010. Transformative constitutionalism in South Africa: creative use of 
Constitutional Court authority do advance substantive justice. The Journal of Gender, Race & Justice, 13:575-
614. Available in: http://ssrn.com/abstract=18908885. Access: 22/04/2012; KLARE, K.E. 1998. Legal culture and 
transformative constitutionalism. South African Journal on Human Rights, 14:146 e ss.; LANGA, Pius. Trans-
formative constitutionalism. Stellenbosch Law Review, 2006. Available at < http://sun025.sun.ac.za/portal/
page/portal/law/index.afrikaans/nuus/2006/Pius%20Langa%20Speech.pdf, access in 04/01/2012
26  A detachment of an ordinary foundationalist understanding of the constituent moment, as the previous 
narrative shows may also be pointed as a feature in the Brazilian and the Colombian experience that brings 
them closer to transitional constitutionalism.
27  The most significant example in the Brazilian constitution was the social function of property rights. The 
right to property is granted in art. 5o. XX, and its subordination to the so called social function is the following 
commandment (art. 5o., XXI) – the meaning of that constraining clause is not in the constitution, but has been 
developed through further legislation (Civil Code, Urban Planning Code and other legal documents), and is still 
object of intensive controversy.
28  That number should not be took as final; there are other fundamental rights mentioned along the Brazil-
ian Constitution. There is also a specific clause (article 5º, § 2º) which states that the rights and guarantees 
expressed in the constitution do not exclude other ones deriving from the principles contained in the Funda-
mental Text, or from international treaties in which Brazil is a signing party.
29  Gilmar Mendes, former Chief Justice of the Brazilian Supreme Court, and still a Justice in the bench, remarks 
the difficulty proposed to the Court in facing “…the increasing demand from society with a deep commitment 
to the realization of fundamental rights…” That task, according to Mendes, “… can be especially complex in cases 
concerning socio-economic rights, which are declared in the Brazilian 1988 constitutional text by directly applicable 
legal norms…”  (Mendes, Gilmar.  The Judiciary and the right to Health”, speech delivered in the “Judiciary 
and the right to Heath” Princeton University, (EUA). March 25th, 2010, available at http://www.stf.jus.br/portal/
cms/verNoticiaDetalhe.asp?idConteudo=122591&sigServico=noticiaArtigoDiscurso&caixaBusca=N).
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constitution may be submit to judicial appreciation, in a competency shared by all the 
levels of the judiciary power, and not reserved to the constitutional court.
The judicialization of socioeconomic rights is, therefore, a clear possibility in the 
Brazilian system; resulting from the constitutional commitment with human dignity, set 
as a fundamental objective of the Republic (article 1º, III of the Brazilian constitution). 
In a comparative perspective, the Brazilian provision aligns with a worldwide tendency 
in constitutional design present since the late 1990’s, of formally recognizing socioeco-
nomic rights. The analytic structure adopted by the Brazilian Constitution – there are 78 
individual fundamental rights listed in article 5; and 34 in article 6, which contemplates 
socioeconomic rights30 – is a testimony of the belief that social transformation may be 
achieved through constitutional commitments.
It should be note that the immediate efficacy clause in Brazil was initially red as 
establishing towards the State, a duty of instantaneous and complete action needed 
to grant the constitutional socioeconomic right. Progressive realisation – a known con-
cept that was adopted by the South African Constitution in some of the socioeconomic 
rights provisions – was seen as an alternative incompatible with the Brazilian constitu-
tion. That kind of perception about the meaning of immediate efficacy spread around 
the Brazilian constitutional literature, and was clearly, at the time, a political discourse: 
fearing that the constitutional commitments with social transformation might became 
symbolic promises, the assertion of the authority of such clauses and its possible judi-
cial scrutiny was a way to its enforcement.  
Colombia’s constitution, differently, has an express list of rights provided with 
immediate efficacy (art. 85)31 – none of them, socioeconomic rights. On the other hand, 
socioeconomic rights are not associated to a clause of gradual implementation, as in 
South Africa’s constitution. The public duties related to socioeconomic rights are ex-
tracted from general clauses like art. 2 of the Colombia constitution, which establishes 
that the effectiveness of principles and rights enounced in it is an essential purpose of 
the State. Another interesting feature in the Colombian system is an express clause (art. 
13) that enounces priority in providing fundamental rights favouring the discriminated 
and the marginalized. That same clause refers to a special protection of those in a per-
sonal condition that expresses manifest weakness32.
30  That number should not be took as final; there are other fundamental rights mentioned along the Brazil-
ian Constitution. There is also a specific clause (article 5º, § 2º) which states that the rights and guarantees 
expressed in the constitution do not exclude other ones deriving from the principles contained in the Funda-
mental Text, or from international treaties in which Brazil is a signing party.
31  In the list contained in article 85 of the Colombian constitution, one may find a various range of rights such 
as the right to life, protection against torture and cruel treatment, personality, intimacy, self development, 
freedom of thought and religion, petition to public agencies, work, learning, due process, etc., etc..
32  Once again, one can see the convergence between the Colombian system, and the South African experi-
ence. After all, even without an express provision referring to a especial protection those victims of discrimina-
tion or marginalization, the assertion that protection of the the vulnerable should be a feature of public policy 
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A preference sign favouring any part of the population is not an express clause 
in the Brazilian constitution. On the contrary, in the right to health for instance, the Bra-
zilian constitution refers to a principle of universalization – and there is still controversy 
over what the meaning of that principle is. Even though it seems reasonable that public 
plans and policies should privilege the vulnerable segments of society, especially in 
a matter like health; one could easily find in the Brazilian jurisprudence, the concept 
that States duties when it comes to health comprehends even wealthy people. That 
assertion is grounded in the idea that constitutional protection to a health’s right is a 
direct emanation of human dignity as the fundamental grind of the Brazilian Federative 
Republic – and that feature is the same, and should be equally protected among rich 
and poor. 
That double indeterminacy in the Brazilian system – fundamental rights grant-
ed, without a precise content and with no priority, parameters when it comes to who 
should be the prior addressees of public policies present as a result, an increasing level 
of judicialization about those rights, as will be demonstrated in the following. 
The understanding of both constitutional systems – the Brazilian and the Co-
lombian ones – when it comes to fundamental rights and their protection will not be 
complete without a glance of the legal guarantees that may apply when those rights 
are not fulfilled by the executive or the legislative branch.
2.3.  Legal guarantees of fundamental rights in Brazil and Colombia
Once more, the approximation between the Brazilian and the Colombian con-
stitution and others qualified as transformational or aspirational seems correct. Both 
of them incorporate a comprehensive institutional system that should work in case of 
constitutional infidelity by the political branches – and the judiciary is presented as the 
mediator, or even, the main responsible in promoting effectiveness of socioeconomic 
rights, even thorough correcting public policy.
That kind of constitutional engineering is understandable through the historical 
perspective, in which extreme concentration of power in the Executive branch is point 
as a common reaction of the conservative forces in Latin America33. In such a scenery, 
preventing inertia and providing formal mechanisms aimed to overcome the non-ob-
servance of those constitutional priorities is a constitutional feature as needed as the 
entrenchment of the fundamental rights themselves. 
that promotes progressive implementation of socioeconomic rights was present since the earlier decisions like 
Government of the Republic of South Africa and others vs. Grootboom vs. others.
33  GARGARELLA, Roberto.  The constitution of inequality. Constitutionalism in the Americas. 1776-1860. I-Con, 
Volume 3, Number 1, 2005, p. 1-23, available at http://www.ead.unb.br/aprender2013/pluginfile.php/904/
course/section/1076/Int%20J%20Constitutional%20Law-2005-Gargarella-1-23.pdf, access in 10/28/2014.
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In Brazil, a violation of fundamental rights may be scrutinized by individual or 
collective lawsuits34, in which judicial review (analysis of the constitutionality of a law 
provision) will de exercise – or not. The judicial complain may simply involve an unfair 
exclusion of the plaintiff from the realm of a public policy that is already in course; or it 
may be grounded in the assertion that a constitutional provision requires some kind of 
public policy that simply do not exist. 
Judiciary examination of a rights violation is grant to everyone by a constitu-
tional principle called “access to justice”. Therefore, any conflict related to any right may 
be submitt to the judiciary – and if the prospect plaintiff cannot pay for the legal fees, 
he can be exempt by simply declaring that he cannot pay for them without prejudicing 
his basic needs. Legal representation is provided by a state institution called “Defenso-
ria Pública”, which is a board of lawyers, that become public servants by public competi-
tion, whose job is to represent the underprivileged in lawsuits of any kind, even against 
the State that provides their own salary. 
The scenery in Brazil is not complete without mentioning another public insti-
tution called “Ministério Público”, which represents the “society’s interests”. They too are 
public servants, with tenure and other guarantees granted so as to allow them to keep 
track of governmental activity, and even promote lawsuits if they believe the collective 
interest is not being sufficiently served. Tenure and no salary regression are import-
ant guarantees that should prevent the institution from feeling impaired of retaliations 
such as salary cuts or being fired. Also, selection by public competition – and not elec-
tion – complete a framework in which those institutions are nor called primarily to do 
political choices when it comes do public interests protection.
Usually, a lawsuit in Brazil involving fundamental rights will be settled by the 
lower courts and not by the Constitutional Court. This curious arrangement is due to 
an understanding in the Brazilian judiciary system that the Constitutional Court should 
not deal with factual evidences; their task is to only interpret and protect constitutional 
rules, and this is something that should be done without any consideration of facts. 
That is, the protection of the Constitution in Brazil happens through an evaluation of 
hypothetical risks and threats, without dealing with case-specific issues. 
This a very challenging feature of the Brazilian judicial system, especially after 
the 1988’s constitution and its large list of fundamental rights. Surely, when it comes to 
the violation of fundamental rights, the facts are all that matters. If not the facts of the 
34  Collective lawsuit is a literal translation of the Brazilian legal expression – in the United States they would be 
called “class actions”. In the Brazilian system, a collective lawsuit requires a violation of a right that transcends 
one single person; that encompasses a determinate collectivity, or even as indeterminate one – in what we call 
trans-individual rights. Those kind of lawsuits, according to the Brazilian procedural system, should be filed from 
the beginning, through an association, union or any other kind of organization that represent collective interests. 
Brazilian procedural law also allow a collective lawsuit to be filed by federation members (central government, 
States governments and municipalities) and by public institutions in charge of protecting societies interests.
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case, at least the ones related to the public policies made by the government in that 
area. A proportionality test could never be hold in disregard of the facts – and then, a 
decision about the constitutional meaning of social right rides on a very thin line be-
tween a merely abstract assertion, and a glance at the factual circumstances of the case. 
There is not in the Brazilian system, a writ, or a particular way through which a 
citizen could bring his violation of a fundamental right directly to the Constitutional 
Court. There’s a general remedy, called “extraordinary appeal”, that is oriented to the Su-
preme Court – but it could involve any kind of constitutional litigation; it is not reserved 
exclusively to the protection of fundamental rights. 
So how do fundamental rights get to the Constitutional Court in Brazil? Through 
the already mentioned “extraordinary appeal”, that won’t be granted if the discussion 
presented to the Court is found “contaminated” by a factual discussion. Of course, this 
is a very broad concept, which causes the Brazilian law community to assert that the 
Constitutional Court examines whatever they feel like examining, dismissing cases that 
seem unimportant or highly controversial, by declaring that the central point of that 
specific lawsuit is the discussion is of facts and not of rules or principles35. 
In that theoretical approach, the Brazilian Constitutional Court has already as-
serted that fundamental rights are justiciable and that the judiciary might in conse-
quence, control and even formulate public policy, in order to assure that public pro-
grams will be answering to sensitive needs in such a field36. There are even decisions 
from the Constitutional Court in Brazil where specific rights are examine – and pro-
claimed as invested with immediate efficacy, therefore demanding prompt deliverance 
of goods and services37. The problem is that those decisions usually limit themselves 
to the assertion that the right is justiciable and that State has duties in promoting and 
protecting it. When it comes to establishing parameters to evaluate public policy or 
even the content of the right in discussion, the Constitutional Court is usually reluctant.
35  As an illustration of what kind of litigation in fundamental rights the Court usually examines, health issues is 
on the “top ten” list. This is a clear example of that flexibility that the Court allows itself when in comes to grant 
– or not – a remedy due to excessive factual background.  
36  The first ruling in which the Constitutional Court proclaimed the possibility of judicial review fall upon pub-
lic policies, striking them out or even formulating a substitutive model, or a new one that should fill the ex-
isting blank was dealing with a fundamental right do access to pre-school (BRAZIL. Federal Supreme Court. 
RE 410715 AgR, Relator(a):  Min. CELSO DE MELLO, Segunda Turma, julgado em 22/11/2005, DJ 03-02-2006 
PP-00076 EMENT VOL-02219-08 PP-01529 RTJ VOL-00199-03 PP-01219 RIP v. 7, n. 35, 2006, p. 291-300 RMP 
n. 32, 2009, p. 279-290). The lawsuit was file due to the circumstance that the city of Santo André, despite the 
constitutional provision that grants pre-school as an element of the right to education, was not providing the 
required public service.  
37  It is also widely known and fairly reported the decisions delivered by the Brazilian Constitutional Court relat-
ed with the health right. The rulings go to order the deliverance of medication, to granting medical procedures, 
or even to hire medic and other health professionals. To a brief view of judicial litigation in the field, FERRAZ, 
Octavio Luiz Motta. The right to health in the courts of Brazil: worsening health inequities? Health and Human 
Rights Jounal. Volume 16, Issue 2: Special Issue on Health Rights Litigation.
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Colombia, on the other hand, has a whole chapter in the constitution regarding 
the protection and application of fundamental rights (Chapter 4), and a wide range of 
procedures related with the preservation of the Constitutional itself38. The crucial role 
was reserved to a particular provision (acción de tutela) designed to protecting consti-
tutional fundamental rights violated or endangered by an action or omission of public 
authorities (art. 86). It is an exceptional remedy, and it should be rejected if any other 
judicial mean is available. It is the same constitution that allows the use of acción de 
tutela as a transitory mechanism oriented to preventing irremediable damage – and in 
that sense it has been largely applied, also due to a progressive interpretation held by 
the Colombian Constitutional Court. 
It is interesting to underline that the judicial system in Colombia, offering the 
possibility of a direct motion to the Constitutional Court just like acción de tutela, pro-
vides in a certain way, a broader social control of the public policy that is in action.  As 
long as any citizen, excluded or damaged by that same governmental plan, can submit 
that exclusion to the judicial control of the Constitutional Court; you don’t have to rely 
so heavily in institutional controls like in Brazil.
Acción de tutela is not a remedy directed exclusively to the Constitutional Court; 
and this is a point that should be stress. It could be directly present by a citizen to any 
judge, even without legal representation. What happens is, as the Constitution deems 
this type of action as one that should be examined with priority, even if the litigation 
starts in a lower court. That feature leads to a tendency of the tutelas to reach higher 
decision levels in a relatively short time, enabling the Constitutional Court to give the 
necessary guidelines about the rights content.
Unlike in Brazil, in Colombia the appreciation of the facts does not seem to be a 
problem when it comes to judicial scrutiny in any level: the Constitutional Court’s decisions 
dedicate a whole section exactly to the exam of the factual aspects of the controversy. 
One more remark to be done about the Colombian Constitutional Court’s and its 
vision of granting fundamental rights – and it is related with de courts orders. Aside from 
the ordinary type of ruling, in which the court provides individualized enforcement of 
a specific constitutional right, or deliver a negative injunction, striking down a norma-
tive command or a public policy in course of action; the Colombian Constitutional Court 
has also applied structural remedies39. That innovative kind of ruling intent to frame, in 
38  New procedures were introduced to safeguard different types of rights and interests protected by the Con-
stitution. Those tools include: 1) a writ to order administrative authorities to fulfil their legal mandates in specif-
ic situations (Acción de Cumplimiento); 2) a writ to protect collective rights (Acción Popular); 3) a writ  to secure 
rights of specific social groups (Acción de Grupo); and finally 4) the writ of protection of fundamental rights 
(Acción de Tutela). (ESLAVA, Luis, Constitutionalization of Rights in Colombia: Establishing a Ground for Mean-
ingful Comparisons (December 16, 2009). Revista Derecho del Estado, Vol. 22, pp. 183-229, 2009. Available at 
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1524547).
39  Describing the experience of the Colombian Constitutional Court with structural injunctions, LANDAU, 
David.  The Reality of Social Rights Enforcement (March 2, 2011). Harvard International Law Journal, Vol. 
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a broader base, obligations that emanate from the constitutional provisions. A second 
very important characteristic of structural injunctions is that they are deliver, usually, in 
a combination of a ruling with some kind of supervisory jurisdiction, meaning, the Court 
monitoring – by itself, or with the help of official agents or even of society organizations 
– the implementation by government, of the initial commands expressed in the ruling.
In a preliminary comparative exercise, it should be noted that the Brazilian solu-
tion sank in opening up the alternatives of judicial scrutiny, by granting everyone ac-
cess to Court, and by empowering public institutions that may support those noncon-
formism with the effectiveness grade of a socioeconomic right. The general idea seem 
to be that when the dispute about a social right arrives in Court, it will meet solution 
due to the juridical expertise of the constitutional judges. If the conflict is grounded 
in rights, law should provide the necessary criteria to solve the tension – facts details 
and administrative difficulties in offering the claimed right are not relevant to finding 
the proper legal answer. The problem is that especially in the grounds of social rights, 
there is much more them a judicial dispute. Social inclusion through a rights granting 
strategy is never set apart from an idea of distributive justice; it is never divorced from a 
choice about funding priorities. In short, debating the due content of a socioeconomic 
right is never merely a juridical debate.
The Colombian approach, on the other hand, embracing the factual analysis; 
providing priority to disputes submitted through acción de tutela and exploring the 
possibilities of structural injunctions seems to assume more clearly that enforcing so-
cioeconomic rights is not a pure legal question; therefore it should go beyond the clas-
sical litigation model.
The clear insufficiency of the classical judicial tools to overcome social rights 
disputes become clearer when the good or service associated with the constitutional 
provision is scarce; a scarcity that do not depends merely on the willingness to spend 
money, but enclose other features that prevent an immediate solution to the lack in the 
offer. This is precisely the difficulty associated with the housing right – that is equally 
protected in the Colombian and in the Brazilian constitution.
3. HOUSING RIGHTS IN BRAZIL AND COLOMBIA: 
CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
The main reference in the Colombian constitution to a housing right is art. 
5140; complemented by another disposition that refers to the State’s duty to promote 
53, No. 1, 2012; FSU College of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 488. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1774914.
40  Article 51 – Every Colombian has a right to a proper home. The State shall establish the necessary conditions 
to make that right effective, and shall promote social policies oriented to provide housing; adequate systems 
in long term financing, and associative forms of executing those housing programs.
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progressive access to land property in favour of rural workers (art. 64). The housing 
right – it should be reminded – is not among the rights provided with immediate effi-
cacy, as stipulated in art. 85. 
The Brazilian constitution, on the other hand, only mentions the housing right 
in art. 6º41, in a large list of socioeconomic rights. It should be clarified that the original 
constitutional text in Brazil did not mentioned a housing right; the reference was in-
cluded by a constitutional amendment in 2000. There is no specific allusion to the effi-
cacy of such right, but it is usually read as one of the many encompassed by the generic 
clause contained in the Brazilian constitution, art. 5º § 1º 42 which grants immediate 
efficacy to fundamental rights. That Brazilian constitutional clause, when interpreted 
together with the openness to new fundamental rights in art, 5º, § 2º 43, leads to a 
comprehension that immediate efficacy is a feature that should be recognized to every 
fundamental right express or implicitly extracted from the Brazilian constitution.
What should be kept in mind when housing issues are examined is the historical 
perspective in developing countries like Brazil or Colombia, because the root of these 
problem indicates meaningful variables that should be taken into account when think-
ing about judicial scrutiny.
In Colombia, population displacement44 is a sensible issue, usually character-
ized as a side effect of the increasing power of armed groups, and their attempt to con-
quer power. Various paramilitary organizations operating in the country for many years, 
as a truly parallel power, created a reality in which armed conflicts were almost routine 
in some regions. A strategic interest of any of those groups in some localities might 
determine massive displacement from a villa or a small town. Displacement could take 
place also because a family or even an individual citizen opposed to the presence of the 
armed group which has gained power. 
The result was a permanent displacement of population, a phenomenon that 
took place through a large period of time – sometimes through massive manifesta-
tions; sometimes silent and undetected, comprehending a family, or maybe a single 
individual, ordered to leave the community by members of one of the armed groups. 
41  Art. 6 º – The social rights are education, health, food, work, housing, leisure, security, social security, mother 
and childhood protection, assistance to the unhelped, as ruled in this Constitution.
42  Art. 5 º § 1º - The provisions defining fundamental rights and guarantees have immediate efficacy.
43  Art. 5 º, §2º – Rights and guarantees expressed in that Constitution do not exclude others related to the 
regimen and principles adopted by itself, or to international treaties in which the Brazilian Federative Republic 
is a party. 
44  The phenomenon is called in Colombia, “desplazamiento”. A perfect translation should take into account 
that the displacement in their country happened mainly due to political conflict between government and 
armed groups that for decades intended to conquer political power. Exile, for sure, is a word that would reveal 
that political background – but still, wont represent properly what happened, because the  population was 
moving, but still in the countries frontiers. That is why displacement was the chosen word to be used in that 
essay.
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Those features resulted also in kind of a concealment of the problem, hidden in the 
broad scenery of an unofficial war45.
This lead to an important characteristic of the Colombian displacement: it stroke 
all kinds of people, and not a particular ethnicity, religion or social group, given that the 
main cause was simply being in the way of the war.46Another relevant feature – a conse-
quence of the multipolar characteristic of the armed conflict – is that the displacement 
reached many regions in the country. The combination of those traces created a very 
heterogeneous group of displaced people – therefore, a collectivity that has no other 
identity other then having been struck (all of them) by the displacement. This will have 
implications in their own capacity to organize themselves as a social group, in order to 
demand from the State a proper response to that unfortunate reality.
That context enlarges housing problems in Colombia, after all, dealing not only 
with the goal of providing shelter, but also the challenge of inserting the displaced 
population into an unknown, even hostile environment must be dealt with. This in-
sertion would mix people of different origins, culture, and history, which could result 
in further discomfort and conflict among them. Furthermore, loosing their roots as a 
result of an unofficial war brought also the problem of belonging: the displaced do not 
perceive themselves as belonging to the community in which they are living.
In Brazil, housing problems are not so deeply related with displacement. Even 
though there is still an exodus to the richest metropolis in the South-East – especially 
when the dry season is more acute in the Northeast –; nowadays housing problems are 
related mainly to the absence of a comprehensive public policy oriented to providing 
that right, especially in the big centres. So, for decades, the government did not offer 
popular houses, or even financing plans – neither for popular housing, nor for the middle 
class ones47. On the other hand, even the private sector was not offering financing or any 
kind of programme related with housing – the country was experiencing hiper-inflation, 
and banks were more interested in the financial market than in housing projects. 
This turned the middle class towards cheaper properties – ones that could be 
bought without special conditions in financing – and left the needy with no alternative 
at all. The consequence was the multiplication of slums in most of the main capitals in 
Brazil, frequently located not only in the suburbs, but also in the centre of those cities48. 
45   GIRALDO, Gloria Naranjo.  El desplazamiento forzado en Colombia. Reinvención de la identidade e implica-
ciones en las culturas locales y nacional. Scripta Nova. Revista Electrónica de Geografía y Ciencias Sociales, 
Universidad de Barcelona [ISSN 1138-9788]  Nº 94 (1), 1 de agosto de 2001.
46  This is an entirely different reality when compared with recent history in South Africa, where displacement 
was a phenomenon that struck mainly the black population, due to laws in the apartheid regime.
47  In the 70’s, there was a public agency named Housing National Bank, that was in charge of financing houses 
– for the poor, middle class – but a series of scandals resulted in its closing. 
48  Another explanation could be offered to slums in the inner city: public transportation is also very precarious 
in big cities in Brazil, turning residency nearby work regardless of the conditions, very attractive.
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That unorthodox solution sought by the less favoured, was consolidated through 
time, resulting in slums like “Rocinha”, in Rio de Janeiro, with a of around 100.000 people. 
A final consideration should be made about the Brazilian housing rights con-
text. Given the fact that the absence of public policies was the main cause of housing 
problems; a state of leniency was installed when it came to the occupation of public 
areas. So, for years the population built improvised shelter in public areas, occupying 
spaces that were originally intended for the expansion of the roads, or other infrastruc-
ture equipment like squares or leisure areas. The nomination of Brazil as headquarter 
for the World Cup in 2014 and the Olympics in 2016 provoked an expressive amount 
of public enterprises taking place in major capitals – which frequently involve finally 
giving public spaces occupied by the population, their originally intended public desti-
nation. Those public enterprises promote the debate around the eviction of those who 
have been living in those public areas, sometimes for decades, sometimes even paying 
taxes related with their precarious houses. In Rio de Janeiro, particularly, where both 
of the sports events will take place, the significant enterprises and transformations in 
transportation and infrastructure that the city must undergo to be prepared for the 
games, have turned populational exodus49 a major issue.
4. JUDICIAL EXAMINATION OF THE HOUSING 
RIGHT IN BRAZIL AND IN COLOMBIA
Despite a common trace in history, comprehending the colonization process 
and violent domination in previous political regimes; and regardless of the clear inspi-
ration that the Colombian Constituent Assembly found in the Brazilian experience with 
the 1988’s constitution; both countries have adopted different paths in dealing with so-
cioeconomic rights – particularly, housing rights, as may be imediatly perceived in the 
constitutional treatment of the subject adopted by each of the. Curiously, as the deci-
sions came to be, the judicial interpretation in those rights in both courts has provided 
different approaches, and the results in the effectiveness standpoint, are unexpected.
4.1.  Assertion of the justiciability of the housing 
right in Brazil and Colombia
 The proclamation itself of the justiticiability of the fundamental rights in Brazil 
was a direct consequence of the already mentioned constitutional clause that provides 
all of the fundamental rights with immediate efficacy50. Even though in the earlier years 
of the 1988’s Constitution validity some discussion was established due to the evident 
49  The expression should be understood as comprehending all kinds of evictions: those related with ilegal 
occupation and expropriations made due to public interest or social need. 
50  To a transcription of the mentioned constitutional clauses, see footnotes 27 and 28.
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cost reflects of the assertion that socioeconomic rights might be judicialized, soon the 
conclusion was that the objection must be overcome by the granting of at least, the 
minimum core or those same rights51.
 The turning point in the Brazilian Constitutional Court related with fundamen-
tal rights and public policy, was the conclusions stated in RE 410715 AgR, Justice Celso 
de Mello, ruled in 11/22/2005. In that decision the Court asserted that, “even though 
the primary prerogative in formulating and executing public policies belong to the 
Legislative and Executive power, it turns possible to the Judiciary, even in exceptional 
basis, especially when it comes to public policies designed by Constitution itself, order 
their implementation by a defaulter state agency, which omission – that implicates in 
the non-fulfillment of their juridical and political mandatory duties – shows itself apt 
to compromise the efficacy and integrity of social and cultural rights provided with 
constitutional status.”
 That first proclamation was repeated and extended to the housing right, recent-
ly, in ARE 639337, Justice Celso de Mello, ruled in 08/23/2011, in which the Constitu-
tional Court asserted that the minimum core notion in fundamental rights is enough to 
“guarantee do citizenry, goods and services provided by the State, sufficient to achieve 
the full enjoinment of basic social rights as a right do education, child protection, right 
to health, social security, housing, food and public security”. 
The conclusion is that housing rights in the Brazilian system are qualified as fun-
damental (despite their socioeconomic nature); and they are provided with immediate 
efficacy, meaning that the State have duties in guaranteeing those rights at the same 
immediate pace. The judiciary may scrutinize public policy in the subject, assuring pri-
ority to the protection of the minimum core of the housing right.
The constitutional framework was not that clear in Colombia. A right to proper 
housing was proclaimed in the Constitution, but as a social right, and excluded of the 
clause that invested some of the fundamental ones with immediate efficacy (art. 85 in 
the Colombian constitution). 
The problem related with that constitutional design arrived at the Colombian 
Constitutional Court in the earlier days. After all, despite the fact that those rights were 
not included in art. 85 of the Colombian constitution; they surely were not supposed 
to be just a wishful thought. From the beginning, the Colombian Constitutional Court 
adopted a position in which in spite of reaffirming the difference on the efficacy lev-
el between the first generation of fundamental rights and the socioeconomic ones, it 
51  As a matter of fact, that theoretical solution still faces a lot of controversy, due to the difficulties associated 
with the concept of minimum core, systematized in YOUNG, Katharine, The Minimum Core of Economic and 
Social Rights: A Concept in Search of Content. Yale Journal of International Law, Vol. 33, No. 1, 2008. Available 
at SSRN: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1136547>. The Brazilian approach in the subject is clearly oriented to a val-
ue-based core, and this left unsolved the challenging possibility of judicial decisions valuing differently dignity 
and freedom when the plaintiffs are from different social stratum. 
87Revista de Investigações Constitucionais, Curitiba, vol. 1, n. 2, p. 67-102, maio/ago. 2014.
Judicial adjudication in housing rights in Brazil and Colombia: a comparative perspective
could discern the possibility of granting the latter some degree of enforceability due to 
its intrinsic relation – considering the circumstances of the case – with a right provided 
with immediate efficacy52. 
The housing right specifically, was appreciated for the first time in Sentencia No. 
T-251/95, in which the absence of immediate efficacy in such a right was reaffirmed. A 
novelty in the Court’s ruling was labeling housing rights as submitted to a progressive 
development clause53 – an expression that in its meaning, is very close to the “progres-
sive realization” clause contained in South Africa’s constitution54.
In the following decisions, the Court proclaimed equally the state’s duty in pro-
viding access to housing programs 55 due to a public interest in facing the housing 
deficit and in protecting the dimension of human dignity that may be challenged by 
the unsheltered condition. 
Finally, in the subject of the justiciability, the Colombian Constitutional Court 
also established that the abstract nature of the public interest clause – that is the foun-
dation of State’s duties related with housing rights – requires that it’s application should 
be oriented to conciliate public interest, individual rights and the social value expressed 
in cultural diversity56. That understanding intends to avoid that housing rights, usually 
52  COLOMBIA. Constitutional Court. Sentencia No. T-506/92, Justice Ciro Angarita Baron, Sala Primera de Re-
visión, ruled in 01/22/92. “Fundamental rights provided with immediate efficacy are those of liberty and formal 
equality, and also some rights designed to promote material equality, related with protecting life and human 
dignity. Their immediate efficacy comes from their general nature, and is valid in every case. Fundamental 
rights provided with indirect efficacy are those socioeconomic or cultural that have a narrow connection with 
fundamental rights provided with immediate efficacy. That kind of efficacy results from the necessity to estab-
lish a balance of the circumstances in each case, which in turn, is a consequence of the very nature of rights that 
presume an unequal treatment in order to achieve some level of material equality”.
53  COLOMBIA. Constitutional Court. Sentencia No. T-251/95, Justice Vladimiro Naranjo Mesa, Sala Novena de 
Revisión de la Corte Constitucional, ruled in 06/05/95. “Constitutional rights submitted to a progressive devel-
opment clause, like housing rights, may only produce effects with the fulfillment of some juridical and material 
conditions that turn them possible – meaning that primarily, those rights are not susceptible of immediate pro-
tection by acción de tutela. Therefore, housing is an objective right from an attendance character, that should 
be developed by legislation and promoted by Public Administration in accordance with the law.”
54  Art. 26. Housing.- (1) Everyone has the right to have access to adequate housing.
(2) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the 
progressive realization of this right.
55  COLOMBIA. Constitutional Court. Sentencia No. T-383/99, Justice Alfredo Beltrán Sierra, ruled in 05/27/99. 
“According to constitution, acquiring and preserving housing to Colombian families cannot be taken as a sub-
ject not knowledgeable to State given that, differently from what happened in an overcome individualistic 
understanding, authorities have a constitutional specific task to fulfill in a favored way, public necessities in 
acquiring houses, facilitating payment in adequate conditions”.
56  COLOMBIA. Constitutional Court. Sentencia No. C-053/01, Justice Cristina Pardo Schlesinger, Sala Plena 
de la Corte Constitucional, ruled in 01/24/01. “It’s precisely the abstract and undetermined character of 
the public interest concept that leaded liberal modern constitutions to consider the necessity in harmo-
nizing it with individual rights and with the social value inherent to cultural diversity. That`s why in order 
to provide prevalence of public interest, an indispensable requirement is that the jurist analyze in great 
detail the particularities of each case, trying to harmonize public interest with individual rights and, if that 
harmonization become impossible, promote a balance taking into account the value hierarchy pointed by 
constitution”.
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scrutinized by an individual lawsuit – acción de tutela – may succumb to a hiper-individ-
ualistic perspective.
In sum, housing rights in Colombia are fundamental – but only invested of im-
mediate efficacy when in narrow connection with first generation fundamental right 
such as liberty or material equality; therefore they can be judicially scrutinized, but in 
a perspective that allows that concrete connection due to particularities of the case. 
4.2.  Scope of judicial analysis in housing rights 
lawsuits in Brazil and Colombia
A clarification should be done in the scope of the judicial rulings in Brazil and 
Colombia, showing a curious paradox. 
As a direct consequence of its own judicial system, litigation in Brazil related 
with socioeconomic rights – and housing is no exception – may be held in individu-
al lawsuits, or in class actions. Adding to that the immediate efficacy of fundamental 
rights, one has an ambience where the Brazilian Constitutional Court is entitled to rule 
in a broader approach, drawing major lines concerning the contents of a right and the 
parameters that should be used to evaluate a possible violation – especially when that 
fundamental right has constitutional status, as happened with housing. That percep-
tion would be reinforced by the Constitutional Courts assertion of the possibility to 
control public policy, which should bring to attention the whole public action program 
in the field. Still, this is not what happens in Brazil.
Despite the proclamation of the justiciability of social rights – including housing 
rights – the Brazilian Constitutional Court has not yet dedicated itself to establishing 
parameters regarding the definition of the abstract content of such a right; nor has it 
spent time listing main features that should be followed by a public policy designed to 
provide such a right. The most frequent technique utilized by the Constitutional Court 
in dealing with those rights would be simply the proclamation of the (in) compatibil-
ity of a legal provision that might have some implication with housing, with the con-
stitutional commitment in protecting housing rights, defining a somewhat negative 
certainty zone57. The Brazilian Constitutional Court did not justify that strategy – there 
is no proclamation of a discretionary zone reserved to the public administration, or 
some kind of deference that should be given to administrative choices. As a result, the 
so-called control of public policies in housing rights is not instructional, but merely by 
reproach, in a non-dialogical relation between the Court and the Administration. There 
57  An example of that kind of strategy can be found in RE 407688, Justice Cezar Peluso, Tribunal Pleno, ruled 
in 02/08/2006, in which the Court asserted the constitutionality of a legal provision that allow a homestead 
property owned by someone who figures as a guarantor in a contract, to be reached by seizure. That same kind 
of decision can be delivered by the Superior Court of Justice, in examining exactly, constitutionality of national 
laws ruling any aspect of property, and how it could be challenged by any legal or judicial decision.
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is not an effort in the sense of framing any normative concept of the content of the 
right itself, or even of the duties that may be established for the State to abide by in 
drawing correspondent public policies. 
That path presents itself as especially doubtful when one takes into consider-
ation the fact that the same Brazilian Constitutional Court asserted that each funda-
mental right has a minimum core that should be judicially protected. That proclama-
tion leads to the inevitable recognition that in spite of the constitutional provision that 
fundamental rights are provided with immediate efficacy, there is a differentiation that 
should be done between the core content of such rights and the peripheral.  That differ-
entiation seams to be an operation to be held by the Constitutional Court, as the main 
guardian of the constitution; and in a broader basis, concurring to a greater effective-
ness of the Fundamental Chart. In spite of all this, the Brazilian Constitutional Court has 
been opting for a path in which the content of the housing right, or the characteristics 
that should be applied to housing programs or public actions of eviction are not a pri-
mary concern and no answer is even hinted at to a public servant that intends to be 
guided by judicial interpretation in the fulfillment of his constitutional duties. 
A predictable risk is that those decisions in housing rights do not really collude, 
neither to increase the protection level of such a right, nor to develop the democratic 
process inherent to the enunciation of a public policy in the field.  Summing up, the 
Brazilian Constitutional Court, when dealing with housing rights has not perceived – or 
at least, has not given a proper answer – to the regressive potential of judicial decisions 
in socioeconomic rights in without considering the necessary dynamic interaction be-
tween legal and broader political processes58. 
An important symptom of how present that risk is, in the Brazilian reality, is the 
solution provided by lower courts to housing rights litigation. Frequently, conflicts in-
volving eviction are being solved by compensatory measures – financial reparation for 
the lost house (or the house that is to be lost, at times); sometimes granting the plain-
tiffs a temporary aid called “social rent”, that is presumed to be enough to provide for 
the needed shelter. That kind of decision, taken in an individual basis is found by judges 
to be granting the housing rights – but it is certainly not doing so. Financial reparation 
or “social rent” does not generate the needed shelter, and usually, the result is simply 
the displacement of the evicted from irregular occupancy to irregular occupancy – and 
most probably, the repetition of the same problem and adjudication in the near future.
Colombia, on the other hand, has been experiencing a different path. Building 
the justiciability of socioeconomic rights in an inherent connection with liberty and 
material equality brought more than a case-oriented approach. The general line of 
58  LIEBENBERG, Sandra.  Socioeconomic rights: adjudication under a transformative constitution. Claremont: 
Juta & Co. Ltd, 2010, p. 41/42.
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thought in developing the possible content of the housing right is built in an inter-
connectivity pattern, that takes into account how those different fundamental rights 
should relate. As a result, the judicial scrutiny necessarily ends up taking into account, 
not only a specific fundamental right, but also a whole set that is inherently related with 
the most evident one claimed in the lawsuit. 
Differently from the Brazilian approach – in which the immediate efficacy is as-
serted in abstract, to each and every fundamental right –; in Colombia a conclusion 
about the possibility of judicial enforcement of a housing right can only be established 
when all the concurring rights are understood on a systematic basis. This is an approxi-
mation that mitigates somehow the regressive potential of the judicial decision; at least 
because it takes in account the whole system of fundamental rights and human dignity 
protection.
Even though judicial decisions in Colombia in the housing subject usually take 
place in acción de amparo – a procedure that, as it was already mentioned is orient-
ed to individual claimings59; the fact is that the definition of the connectivity of the 
concurring rights is a logic operation that is held in abstract, and then applied to the 
concrete situation. That logical operation is reflected even in the physic configuration 
of the Colombian Constitutional Court’s decisions, usually divided in different sections 
which deal with the facts, the previous rulings and the juridical problem that should 
be faced. The Court’s considerations are delivered in that same order, examining the 
juridical problem in abstract, and only then promoting the conciliation between the 
premises established in facing the juridical problem with the facts of the case.
That strategy in building the Colombian Constitutional Court’s decisions re-
sults in the enouncement of abstract parameters that may orient the comprehension 
of the effects of a housing right, though qualified as a socioeconomic one, in public 
action. This was the context in which, for instance, the Colombian Constitutional Court 
affirmed that an eviction promoted by public administration in public areas should ob-
serve due process – meaning the citizen who would be struck by the eviction should be 
allowed argue against it. The Colombian Court also asserted that in situations where a 
state of legitimate trust was established between the citizens and the Administration 
related with the possibility of building in a determined area, an eviction process in that 
same place should be constrained, and the removal subordinated to the offer of an 
allocation alternative by State60.
59  It should be noted that sometimes, the Colombian Constitutional Court decides collectively a big amount 
of acción de tutela, in an accurate intellectual exercise of dealing with a problem in a macro vision, an them 
applying those macro parameters to individual situations – as an example, COLOMBIA, Constitutional Court, 
Sentencia SU-360 de 1999, Justice Alejandro Martinez Cabalero, Sala Plena, ruled in 05/19/1999, dealing with 
dozens of workers were claiming a right to oppose to eviction from public spaces.
60  Recently, in Sentencia T-437 de 2012, the Colombian Constitutional Court granted tutela to an old man that 
has been living in a public space for almost 20 years, even paying taxes for the occupied area. The main reason 
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The combination of the housing right, and the previously mentioned constitu-
tional provision of a special protection favoring the most vulnerable also allowed the 
Colombian Constitutional Court to grant protection in favor of women who are heads 
of the family61 and children62.
The paramount decision in housing rights, in which that abstract reasoning, fol-
lowed by its concrete application in the existent acciones de tutela is certainly Sentencia 
T-025 de 200463, in which the Colombian Constitutional Court decided at a time, 105 
acciones de tutela, all of which concerned the inadequacy or insufficiency of the pub-
lic policy designed to deal with the internally displaced people. In that decision, the 
Court proclaimed what it called an “unconstitutional state of things”64, meaning, a gen-
eral incompatibility between the public policy that was in course to provide shelter for 
those people, and the constitutional parameters related with the promoting of social 
inclusion, material equality and human dignity. In the ruling, the Court examined the 
postponing arguments that Public Administration usually presents – budgetary prob-
lems, constrictions related with bigger priorities, etc. – asserting a general obligation 
for the State in taking action, granting a minimum level of protection and preventing 
regression in that same cover.
One additional comment deserves to be made, due to its novelty. In the Co-
lombian judicial system, the procedure to be observed in “acción de tutela” is regulated 
by Decreto 2591 de 1991, in which a provision can be found (art. 27)65 that allows the 
was that it could be seen a legitimate trust by the petitioner, that his occupancy has been somehow taken as 
regular by Administration, that was offering him public services and charging him taxes. (COLOMBIA. Consti-
tutional Court, Sentencia T-437 de 2012, Justice Adriana María Guillém Arango, Sala Tercera de Revisión de la 
Corte Constitucional, ruled in 06/12/12.)
61  COLOMBIA. Constitutional Court. Sentencia T-079 de 2008, Justice Rodrigo Escobar Gil, Sala Cuarta de Re-
visión de la Corte Constitucional, ruled in 01/31/08..
62  COLOMBIA. Constitutional Court. Sentencia T-617 de 1995, Justice Alejandro Martinez Caballero, Sala Sépti-
ma de Revisión de tutelas de la Corte Constitucional, ruled in 21/13/95. This is a decision with many in common 
with Government of the Republic of South Africa and others vs. Grootboom vs. others, where de pivotal reason to 
the granting of the tutela was a massive presence of children in a community struck by eviction. The decision 
of the Court determined also that the correspondent public agencies should take the necessary provisions in 
order to provide the basic conditions necessary to preserve the families’ unity and the children’s protection: 
“The existence of minors does not block a judicial or administrative order of eviction. Nevertheless, the State 
cannot disregard its duties related with child protection, preserving familiar unity, especially when the children 
live in inhuman conditions”.
63  COLOMBIA. Constitutional Court. Sentencia 025 de 2004, Justice Manuel José Cepeda Espinosa, Sala Tercera 
de Revisión, ruled in 01/22/2004.
64  This was not precisely the first time in which the Court applied that concept; as a matter of fact since 1997 
there have been seven decisions of this kind, in a broad range of subjects, as noncompliance with the state’s 
obligation to affiliate numerous public officials to the social security system, massive prison overcrowding, lack 
of protection for human rights defenders and failure to announce an open call for public notary nominations 
(RODRÍGUEZ-GARAVITO, César.  Beyond the courtroom: the impact of judicial activism on socioeconomic rights 
in Latin America. Texas Law review,Vol. 89 (7), 2011).
65  Art. 27 – In every case, the judge will establish the effects of his decision to the concrete case, and will main-
tain competency until the right is entirely reinstated or the menace causes ceased.
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Court to dedicate itself to a supervisory jurisdiction. That strategy is being fully used in 
monitoring the compliance with the Court’s decision in such a difficult matter as  that 
of the displaced people. The Court even ordered66 and has already promoted a special 
public audience that, according to its own ruling should “evaluate the effectiveness of 
the different disciplinary, fiscal and judicial mechanisms that provide compliance with 
the orders delivered by the Constitutional Court as ruller of an acción de tutela intend-
ing to protect displaced people; also the obstacles and institutional practices that have 
turned difficult the application of the decision.
So here is the paradox: Regardless of the apparent stronger character of the 
housing right in the Brazilian constitution due to its immediate efficacy, the fact is that 
judicial protection by Constitutional Court is being held in a minimalist approach. This 
is a curious deviation from Mark Tushnet’s thesis67 that opposes two models: strong 
rights and weak courts, or weak rights and strong courts. In Brazil, housing rights may 
be seen as strong – but in reality, they are not, due to the lack of density in the corre-
spondent constitutional clause. Judicial review in Brazil may be theoretically qualified 
as a strong-form, considering that courts have general authority to determine what  the 
Constitution  means, through constitutional  interpretations  equally authoritative and 
binding to  the other branches68. Despite that apparent strong-rights and strong-courts 
combination, minimalist rulings do not reveal, and are not capable of generating the 
intended transformational effect.
In Colombia, on the contrary, the lack of immediate efficacy did not paralyze 
the Court. In a creative interpretation, inserting housing rights in the complex of fun-
damental rights that should be protected in order to preserve the core value of human 
dignity, the Colombian Constitutional Court carved a strategy that enhances the trans-
formational potential of its own practice, exchanging parameters and evaluation with 
public administration, in order to improve public programs in the subject. Even the 
binding effect, that is not clearly stated in the Colombian Constitution, was affirmed by 
the Court through the expansion of the originally inter partes effects of tutela, granting 
inter communis effects to persons who have not actually filed the corresponding tutela, 
but share common circumstances with the plaintiffs, belong to the same community, 
and might be negatively affected by a decision that does not include them.
Even the public audience that took place in the displaced people matter is a 
demonstration of a dialogic practice of judicial review in socioeconomic rights; an ap-
proach that does not rely exclusively in the judicial capacity to interfere and transform 
66  COLOMBIA. Constitutional Court. Auto 219 de 2011, Justice Luis Ernesto Vargas Silva, Sala Especial de Segui-
miento a la Sentencia T-025 de 2009, ruled in 10/13/2011.
67  TUSHNET, Mark.  Weak courts, strong rights. Judicial review and social welfare rights in comparative 
constitutional law.  United States: Princeton University Press, 2008.
68  TUSHNET, M. 2003. Alternative forms of judicial review. Michigan Law Review, 101:2781-2802.
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reality, but requires a broader range of public agents, critics and social organization, 
that should provide a pluralistic view69, enhancing the chances of a consistent and 
progressive public action in the subject. Activism here appears not to be a behavior 
pattern drawn in an adversarial contraposition between power branches; activism in 
the Colombian Constitutional Court is a strategy designed to increase institutional 
capacities and coordinate public efforts in order to fulfill the State’s constitutional 
commitments. 
5. JUDICIAL PROTECTION IN HOUSING RIGHTS 
AND DEMOCRACY: A SUBJECT TO BE FACED 
IN BRAZIL AND ALSO IN COLOMBIA
The Constitutional Courts’ courses evidence that litigation in housing rights is 
probably a phenomenon in a progressive curve. The housing deficit in Brazil, in 2008 
was estimated in 5,5 million (in governmental numbers)70; in Colombia, in 2005 the 
same deficit was established in 3,8 million71. Besides that, the judicialization of the pub-
lic policies is also a tendency in those countries – as it seams to be in the whole world72 
– in a pattern that doesn’t seem likely to change in the next years73. The classic causes 
for that phenomenon , such as the discredit of the Executive and Legislative branch, or 
in the other side of the spectrum, a strategy held by those same political branches ori-
ented to depoliticize those subjects – therefore, lightening their political burden in any 
course of action; those are problems that would still be in the scenery. The challenge 
is how to protect housing rights, in the sense the constitution intended to do, without 
falling back into the trap that is the judicialization of socioeconomic rights. 
69  On the importance of a polycentric view when it comes to the enforcement of socioeconomic rights, 
dialoguing with the South African experience in judicial review, RAY, Brian, Policentrism, Political Mobili-
zation and the Promise of Socioeconomic Rights (December 9, 2009). Stanford Journal of International 
Law Vol. 45, p. 1; Cleveland-Marshall Legal Studies Paper No. 08-154. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1098939.
70  These data were found in a survey held by the Cities Ministry, coted by the federal legislative, available 
at <http://www2.camara.leg.br/camaranoticias/noticias/ADMINISTRACAO-PUBLICA/196187-DEFICIT-HABITA-
CIONAL-NO-BRASIL-E-DE-5,5-MILHOES-DE-MORADIAS.html>, access in 02/14/2013. 
71  These data are provided by Centro de Estudios de la Construcción y el Desarollo urbano y regional, available 
at http://www.cenac.org.co/index.shtml?apc=I1----&x=20152718, access in 02/14/2013.
72  HIRSCHL, Ran.  The judicialization of mega-politics and the rise os political courts, Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci. 
2008. 11: 93-118. 
73  In the Colombian experience in judicialization of politics, mapping challenges and benefits, YEPES, Ro-
drigo Uprimny. Judicialization of politics in Colombia: cases, merits and risks. Sur,  São Paulo,  v. 3,  Select-
ed Edition  2007 .Available from <http://socialsciences.scielo.org/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1806 
-64452007000100003&lng=en&nrm=iso>. access on  15  Feb.  2013. The Brazilian experience in the same path 
is described in VALLE, Vanice Lírio do.  Judicialization of Socio-Economic Rights in Brazil: The Subversion of an 
Egalitarian Discourse (March 30, 2012). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2031719 or http://dx.doi.
org/10.2139/ssrn.2031719.
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5.1.  Scarcity and public choices
When it comes to housing, two variables are extremely important. One of them 
is the scarce nature of the intended good – and the argument here is not only based 
in the budgetary problems. One house is rarely like another. There are intangible as-
pects that give particular value to a house – and not to another. Location, community, 
personal history, working place proximity, availability of public transportation, familiar 
neighborhood – all those are aspects that influence the value that someone perceives 
in a particular house. So the scarcity is an inevitable problem when it comes to housing 
programs – because it is not physically possible to assure to every possible displaced 
or evicted person, that their new destination would be just like the place they are cur-
rently leaving. 
The second variable – intrinsically related with the first one – is that if scarcity 
is an inevitable issue, choices should be made, and when it comes to public choices, 
every inclusion brings a correspondent exclusion. If a public park is to finally be created, 
providing better life quality in a community, it may require evictions if the public area is 
invaded. So here we face a first choice: maintaining people in the invaded area and de-
priving the neighborhood of the park, or building the park at the cost of those people’s 
houses? We can always build the park somewhere else – would this be an acceptable 
solution? Will it increase the costs? Would it suffice to guarantee the benefits the build-
ing of the park seeks to provide?
The usual proposition – and in fact, the inclination of the Colombian Constitu-
tional Court74 – is that the State should provide some form of alternative sheltering to 
the displaced or evicted, and it seems to be a good solution. The problem is that the 
alternatives provided by State embrace modifications in the many elements that com-
pound housing provision. A large community that is evicted because they are placed 
in some kind of risk area may not agree do be separated in many settlements. Or they 
might prefer to be settled somewhere else – even more distant, but where they could 
stay together. 
In Rio de Janeiro, recently, the settlements provided by a public policy called 
“My house, my life”, a joint effort of the three federation levels, normally provides apart-
ments located in small buildings – and that choice has proven to be a controversial 
one, because people in the slums or irregular occupations usually prefer houses. Why? 
74  The Brazilian Constitutional Court has not examined any case like this – so there is no precedent to allow 
any kind of speculation. The Brazilian judiciary as a whole – and the reference is especially to the lower 
courts – is deciding just like the Colombian Constitutional Court, trying to establish a balance between 
a compelling public interest that may determinate the eviction, and the protection of the housing right; 
usually this is done by demanding Public Administration to provide some kind of alternative of shelter to 
the evicted.
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Because another floor can be built if the family grows, a son get married, a mother-in-
law comes to live with the original family.
Scarcity and public choices is a duality that pervades housing conflicts; and this 
is a central idea that has not been incorporated to the Constitutional Courts decisions 
in the subject. The supposedly technical decision that orders public authorities to pro-
vide some alternative to the deprived cannot be executed without taking into account 
non-technical variables – such as the sense of belonging and individual autonomy and 
even the subject of the legitimacy of such a choice.
For sure, the already mentioned decision in Sentencia 025/04 and the following 
pronouncement in supervisory jurisdiction are exceptions in the Colombian scenery. 
But even in there, the normal standards of the Court’s decisions do not take into ac-
count that inherent duality in scarce resources and public choices.
5.2.  Legitimaticy and emancipation 
One of the indicated causes to judicialization of socioeconomic rights – and 
housing should not be an exception – is the low level of social organization, which 
presents the political path as a winding one, turning the judicial response more appeal-
ing. When the Court began its work, the Colombian population turned to the constitu-
tional instance to demand answers to problems that, in principle, should be debated 
by means of citizen’s participation in the political sphere and resolved by the State’s ac-
tion75.  In Brazil, the number of “extraordinary appeals”76 has risen from 10.780 in 1990, 
to 42.790 in 201277 . The activist trace of both Constitutional Courts is usually pointed 
– by themselves and by part of the law community – as a valuable one. 
In Brazil, in 2008, in the inauguration of the President of the Supreme Court, one 
of its Justices – Celso de Mello – reaffirmed that judicial activism could be justified by 
many causes, as a positive jurisprudential construction that could allow the real practice 
of rights proclaimed by the Constitution itself, including the supremacy of the Funda-
mental Chart, many times disrespected and wounded by inadmissible omission of the 
public powers78. The combination of these perceptions lead Constitutional Courts in 
Brazil and Colombia toward a very tricky road, in which the real democratic transforma-
tion intended to be held by the constitution may be replaced by another authoritarian 
75  SOUSA SANTOS, Boaventura de and AVRITZER, Leonardo Avritzer.  Opening Up the Canon of Democracy’, in 
SOUSA SANTOS, Boaventura de (ed.).  Reinventing Social Emancipation: Toward New Manifestos, Volume 
1: Democratizing Democracy: Beyond the Liberal Democratic Canon (2005).
76  As alterady mentioned in that same paper, “extraordinary appeal” is the writ that may be presented to the 
Brazilian Supreme Court, allowing the examination of a conflict envolving fundamental rights.
77  Data extracted from the statistic’s page of the Supreme Federal Court, available at <http://www.stf.jus.br/
portal/cms/verTexto.asp?servico=estatistica&pagina=pesquisaClasse>, access in 02/15/2013.
78  Data extracted from the press page of the Supreme Federal Court, available at <http://www.stf.jus.br/arqui-
vo/cms/noticiaNoticiaStf/anexo/discursoCM.pdf>, access in 02/15/2013.
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ruling, in which violence is not be the main tool, but the cultural stereotype that sees 
the impoverished as passive beneficiaries of social goods is constantly reinforced79. 
If the enforcement of housing rights necessarily involves managing scarcity and 
public choices, this is a decision that trespasses the technical frontier, and requires a 
broader legitimacy, that could only come with a dialogical trace. After all, as pointed by 
Dixon80, in enforcing rights, courts have a much greater capacity, even a responsibility, 
to play an active role in countering “blind spots” and “burdens of inertia” in the political 
process than is envisaged in other theories. This is a task that might be largely facilitat-
ed with practices of monitoring the implementation of the decisions, like experienced 
by Colombia in Sentencia 025/04. 
In Brazil, that responsibility in punctuating the correspondent roles in the dem-
ocratic process of each and every branch of power seems to be ignored by the Court. 
Relying on the immediate efficacy of the housing right, the Constitutional Court acts 
and decides as if everyone knew perfectly well what the content of that right should be. 
In the Colombian case, the cooperative constitutionalism and the dialogical ex-
ercise have already begun – at least in regard to the outlining of the attributes that 
should endow public policies or programs. Granting due process in evictions initiatives; 
recognizing the juridical relevancy of a state of trust related with an occupation; as-
signing the State an obligation to offer alternative solutions when promoting massive 
removal of people; fixing those premises the Colombian Constitutional Court initiates 
the dialogue, at least with public authorities.
A dimension that is still unexplored by both countries is the participatory ones 
– and that is the point where legitimacy meets emancipation.
As rightly highlighted by Liebenberg81, human rights adjudication permanently 
contemplates a paradox between the universal and the particular; the universal pre-
tension deeply rooted in the human rights discourse, and the necessary compliance 
with the multiple particularities in the real life. Housing rights contemplates that same 
paradox, not only due to the particularities of individuals, situations or locations, but 
because they cannot be provided without the overcome of the problems of scarcity 
and public choices. Building any kind of solution in housing rights that ignores the dy-
namics of the stricken collectivity, inspired by an abstract idea of how shelter should be 
provided, may lead to a judicial order that is unfit to solve the real problem. 
79  LIEBENBERG, Sandra.  Socioeconomic rights: adjudication under a transformative constitution. Claremont: 
Juta & Co. Ltd, 2010, p. 41.
80  DIXON, R osalind, Creating Dialogue about Socioeconomic Rights: Strong-Form versus Weak-Form Judicial 
Review Revisited (2007). International Journal of Constitutional Law, Oxford Journals, Vol. 5, No. 3, pp. 391-
418, 2007. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1536716 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1536716.
81  LIEBENBERG, Sandra.  Engaging the paradoxes of the universal and particular in human rights adjudication: 
The possibilities and pitfalls of ‘meaningful engagement’” (2012) 12  African Human Rights Law Journal 1 – 
29.
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A judicial solution, built on a top-to-bottom basis can be easier – but may find 
in its own addressee, the main resistance. It may be found lawful by the evicted or the 
unsheltered but unjust, and therefore, illegitimate. That is why enlarging the universe 
of carvers of the judicial solution may be important not only to reinforce the legitimacy, 
but also to strengthen people’s right to, as an autonomous person, be involved in the 
solution of the problem that is afflicting their own life – not the judge’s, nor the public 
official’s. As remarked by Sachs82, in socioeconomic rights justiciability, the solution is 
not necessarily in the binomial libertarian versus communitarian – but it could also be 
find in a dignitarian vision, in which respecting human dignity must involve emanci-
pation and autonomy. After all, if freedom is the possibility of choosing your own life 
project, the public choices that would impose effects on your life and house should be 
open to participation. 
In South Africa, that participatory dimension in housing rights conflicts has 
been explored with the setting of “meaningful engagement” as a requirement to public 
initiatives that may menace housing rights. The leading case was Occupiers of 51 Olivia 
Road, Berea Township and 197 Main Street Johannesburg v City of Johannesburg and Oth-
ers, the Constitutional Court orders that “The City of Johannesburg and the applicants 
are required to engage with each other meaningfully and as soon as it is possible for 
them to do so, in an effort to resolve the differences and difficulties aired in this applica-
tion in the light of the values of the Constitution, the constitutional and statutory duties 
of the municipality and the rights and duties of the citizens concerned”. 
A second case rapidly presented itself to the South African Constitutional Court 
– Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes and Others – in 
which the engagement idea was still present, even though in a much more modest 
proportion. In spite of the still exploratory path in adopting meaningful engagement as 
a condition to court’s appreciation in South Africa, this is an alternative to incorporate 
the participation of the plaintiffs not as a blessing, but as a way to conciliate in judicial 
review, rights and democracy. It is an experience not immune to criticism – losing a 
normative perspective in the solutions building being the main problem – but still, in 
times of judicial network, it is a possibility that might be adapted and explored in major 
conflicts in Brazil or Colombia.
The participatoy dimension is something that concerns only those driven by a 
constructive comprehension of constitutionalism. In that standpoint, a judicial decision 
should not be evaluated solely by the material effects that it provides directly; a judicial 
decision might have indirect or symbolic effects that favors designing a public policy; 
allows forming coalitions to influence the issue; enhances the perception of the subject 
as a rights violations and transforms public opinion about the problem’s urgency and 
82  SACHS, Albie.  The strange alchemy of life and Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 173.
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gravity83. This is a significative addition to the importance of the judicial decision – even 
though it does not assume a naïve presumption that Court by itself would transform 
the world. 
6. CONCLUSION
The report of the Brazilian and the Colombian judicial appreciation of housing 
rights, even in the narrow limits of a working paper suggest important remarks. First, it 
is more than clear that the proclamation itself of the immediate efficacy of a right is not 
enough to guarantee an effective result in its protection. As demonstrated, that consti-
tutional clause was not enough in Brazil – and not necessary in Colombia.
A second important conclusion is that abstract concepts are also not very useful 
in solving housing needs. Particular conditions – of the plaintiffs, of the location, of 
the relationship established by the occupier and the Public Administration – may be 
extremely relevant to the ruling. Even the proclamation by the Brazilian Constitutional 
Court that the minimum core of the housing right should be protected is not enough, 
neither to fulfill the protection, nor to orient public authorities in what the require-
ments that should be applied in a housing program are. This is an important observa-
tion, and should be taken into account by those who feel that minimum core is the key 
concept to give socioeconomic rights a higher degree of effectiveness84.
In sum, granting a complex right such as housing is a task that should be faced 
one step at a time, prioritizing the construction of a normative concept that might be 
tested in each concrete situation. That logical operation won’t be completed in a single 
judgment, but should be revisited in each and every one of them. Knowledge is an as-
set that is built through aggregation – and that is no different when it comes do judicial 
adjudication.
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